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The Impact of the Charter on the 




The enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1  
in 1982 brought about major changes in the content and protection of 
individual rights. This has been particularly pronounced in respect of the 
legal rights contained in sections 7 to 14 of the Charter, and perhaps even 
more so in the case of section 8, which protects us all from unreasonable 
search or seizure. Indeed, the mere fact of section 8’s inclusion in the 
Charter and the attendant possibility of the exclusion of evidence where 
it has been violated immediately resulted in a sea change from the previous 
law.  
Prior to 1982, the law of search and seizure was a combination of 
statutory provisions and common law rules relating to search, seizure and 
police powers, and often overstated statements of the supposed common 
law tradition of respecting individual rights. The harsh reality was that 
evidence obtained through illegality or impropriety by the authorities 
was nonetheless admissible in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court 
of Canada plainly said so in R. v. Wray2 and, although the case turned on 
the admissibility of evidence derived from an involuntary confession, it was 
clear that this rule also applied to illegal or unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
Since 1982, there have been many developments in the law of search 
and seizure. Some of these were seminal decisions by the Supreme Court 
of Canada. Others have consisted of statutory responses by the federal 
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 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982,  
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, 11 C.R.N.S. 235 (S.C.C.). 
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and provincial governments to Charter jurisprudence.3 One striking 
consequence of the passage of section 8 is that there is considerably 
more law on search and seizure than previously. This paper will provide an 
overview of these changes in the law and an assessment of the impact that 
the Charter has had in this area of the law. It will not be a comprehensive 
analysis of all of the law on search and seizure. Instead, I have attempted 
to choose and discuss the highlights from the extensive jurisprudence in 
the area. 
Because I am critical of some of the legal developments in this area, 
a couple of points are worth making at the outset. First, virtually all of 
the litigation concerning Charter legal rights and especially in relation to 
searches and seizures concerns individuals who are factually guilty. Thus, 
there is often a temptation to side with the state authorities when evidence 
of culpability has been located despite flaws in the manner in which it was 
located. This temptation should be resisted because we must recognize 
that innocent persons subjected to the same police behaviour have no 
effective remedies and therefore seldom challenge the conduct. Moreover, 
an extremely high proportion of criminal cases are disposed of without 
going to trial and therefore there is no opportunity to assert the violation 
of rights. As a consequence, constitutional safeguards must be examined 
in cases where the individual might otherwise be found guilty. If we are 
to be fair minded about constitutional rights, we would be well advised to 
attempt to put out of our minds what the police actually discovered and 
assess the constitutional position as if the individual were factually 
innocent. 
Second, where the courts have found that constitutional rights trump 
police efficiency, they have frequently been accused of “judicial activism”. 
In truth, however, because the judiciary has been charged with the oversight 
of constitutional safeguards but the document itself is necessarily framed in 
general language, judges are obliged to both interpret and apply Charter 
provisions. In that sense, of course, they are activists. But it is a role 
forced upon them by the nature of their positions and the absence of any 
other means of upholding constitutional rights. Later in this paper, I will 
suggest that there is another, in my view more dangerous, form of judicial 
activism through the creation or extension of common law police powers. 
There are two sides to the coinage of judicial activism. 
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 Due to the sheer number of provincial and territorial statutory search and seizure powers, 
the emphasis of this paper will be on federal enactments. However, for illustrative purposes, 
reference will occasionally be made to provincial statutes. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 119 
II. THE PRE-CHARTER POSITION 
Before 1982, the Canadian law on search and seizure was not 
devoid of legal principle or standards upon which the police and other 
state authorities could act. However, in light of the reality that evidence 
was admissible no matter how it was obtained, there was relatively little 
jurisprudence relating to search and seizure powers and there was  
no mechanism by which the judiciary could assess the lawfulness or 
reasonableness of such powers. Moreover, in the absence of constitutional 
standards and constraints, there were relatively few such laws, certainly 
by comparison with the present day. 
For instance, what is now section 487 of the Criminal Code4 has 
long required that, to justify the issuance of a search warrant, there must 
be reasonable grounds both to believe that evidence will be located in 
the premises and that the evidence would relate to an offence. Provisions 
containing similar standards were included in the old Narcotic Control 
Act5 and the Food and Drugs Act,6 although, perhaps consistent with our 
ongoing “war on drugs”, these Acts permitted warrantless searches of 
places other than dwelling houses. These were presumably enacted in 
the tradition of protecting the sanctity of one’s home — the oft-repeated 
though patriarchal, “A man’s home is his castle”,7 which, in turn, was 
largely premised on the protection of property rights against trespass.8 
However, in spite of those legal requirements, a study by the then Law 
Reform Commission of Canada found that almost 60 per cent of search 
warrants should not have been issued due to non-compliance with the legal 
standards.9 The absence of meaningful remedies for non-compliance was 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487 [hereinafter “the Code”]. The version in effect just prior to 
passage of the Charter was R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 443. Although there have been several 
amendments over time, the essential requirements for the obtaining of a warrant under this 
provision have remained the same. 
5
 Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, s. 12 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 94]. 
6
 Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, s. 42 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 81]. 
7
 Semayne’s Case (1604), 77 E.R. 194, [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 62 (K.B.). 
8
 Entick v. Carrington (1765), 95 E.R. 807, [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 41 (K.B.). Even at 
this early stage, there was, however, concern expressed about the importance of protecting privacy 
in relation to Entick’s personal papers. 
9
 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Police Powers: Search and Seizure in Criminal 
Law Enforcement (Working Paper 30) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1983), at 83-91 
documented the extent to which police failed to follow proper legal procedures in effecting searches 
and seizures. The Commission engaged a panel of judges to evaluate a sample of warrants; the 
judges found that only about 40 per cent of the warrants were validly issued. Unfortunately, the 
presence of Charter protection and the possibility of excluding evidence obtained through an 
improperly issued warrant have apparently not improved the situation. In a study conducted in 
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undoubtedly a factor in this slipshoddiness of the authorities. Challenges to 
search warrants via certiorari were only of utility in narrow circumstances, 
such as where the applicant learned of the warrant’s existence prior to 
its execution and in time to launch proceedings. Where a search and 
seizure had already occurred, ordering the return of the seized items was 
not (nor is it now) inevitable.10 The Wray11 approach ruled out any 
challenges to admissibility at a criminal trial. Thus, a failure to abide by 
the statutory requirements or even to obtain a search warrant in the first 
place had no adverse consequences for the Crown. 
Apart from statutory search warrant provisions, there were other 
search and seizure powers, both statutory and under the common law. 
The aforementioned Narcotic Control Act12 in sections 10 and 11 and 
Food and Drugs Act13 in section 42, for example, permitted warrantless 
search and seizure powers in respect of places other than dwellings and 
for individuals found therein. Again, probably influenced by the common 
law tradition, these powers were premised on reasonable grounds, a not 
unusual standard for the exercise of police powers. 
But without means of challenging the standards themselves, it was 
not inevitable that such provisions would incorporate objectively verifiable 
grounds. A good example was section 131 of the then Saskatchewan 
Liquor Act,14 which permitted a warrantless search of and seizure from a 
motor vehicle on the subjective belief of a peace officer, fettered neither 
by a quantitative standard nor an objective assessment of the belief.15 
Even more draconian in their breadth were writs of assistance, 
essentially carte blanche search warrants issued under four statutes to 
peace officers or other state authorities without judicial control or scrutiny 
                                                                                                            
Toronto, it was discovered that 69 per cent of the warrants issued should not have been because of 
defects: Casey Hill, Scott Hutchinson & Leslie Pringle, “Search Warrants: Protection or Illusion?” 
(2000) 28 C.R. (5th) 89.  
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 It was relatively late in the pre-Charter jurisprudence that courts began ordering the 
return of seized items: e.g., R. v. Black (1973), 24 C.R.N.S. 203 (B.C.S.C.); Bergeron v. 
Deschamps, [1977] S.C.J. No. 45, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 765 (S.C.C.). As Hill et al. in “Search Warrants: 
Protection or Illusion?” (2000) 28 C.R. (5th) 89 have pointed out, even today successful certiorari 
applications often do not result in the return of the items and, even if they do, the police will 
frequently obtain a new warrant on proper grounds and seize the items once again. 
11
 R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, 11 C.R.N.S. 235 (S.C.C.). 
12
 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 94]. 
13
 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, s. 42 [rep. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 18]. 
14
 Liquor Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-18, s. 131. 
15
 After the enactment of the Charter, the provision was found to be unconstitutional in  
R. v. D. (I.D.), [1987] S.J. No. 653, 61 C.R. (3d) 292 (Sask. C.A.). 
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once issued by a judge.16 The possessor of a writ of assistance could 
therefore search and seize at will. After the Charter came into effect, 
Parliament repealed these provisions because lower courts had already 
noted their obvious non-compliance with constitutional principles.17 
Two common law doctrines were also thin on definition or principle: 
searches incident to arrest and consent searches. The power to search a 
person as an incident of lawful arrest was (and largely still is) a common 
law power. Again, because of the Wray18 approach, it was not necessary 
in terms of the admissibility of the fruits of such searches to establish 
legal parameters. Thus, in R. v. Brezack,19 a throat hold search for drugs 
was upheld as a valid exercise of police duty. In the same case, a further 
search of the accused’s car attracted no comment whatsoever, either 
about whether it was within the ambit of a search incident to arrest or 
whether the accused had “consented” to the search. It is now well accepted, 
of course, that a person may waive constitutional or legal rights by 
consenting to a search or other process but only if certain requirements 
are met — free and unequivocal consent with knowledge of the right and 
the consequence of foregoing it.20 In the pre-Charter period, as Brezack 
implicitly illustrates, consent was more or less equated with obedience 
to authority, although late in that period, the Supreme Court accepted 
that the equation was not an accurate conception of consent.21 
Another common law police power had been shaped to a great 
extent by the judiciary. That was the power for police to enter premises 
in order to make an arrest. In recognition that such an entry is a trespass 
upon the property of the possessor or owner, certain requirements were 
established by Eccles v. Bourque22 and R. v. Landry.23 First, there must 
have been the requisite grounds for arrest, usually reasonable and probable 
grounds. Second, unless the entry was in hot pursuit or other exigent 
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 Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, s. 10; Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970,  
c. F-27, s. 22; Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40, ss. 133 and 134; and Excise Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-12, 
ss. 70 and 71. 
17
 For example, R. v. Noble, [1984] O.J. No. 3395, 42 C.R. (3d) 209 (Ont. C.A.).  
18
 R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, 11 C.R.N.S. 235 (S.C.C.). 
19
 [1949] O.J. No. 492, 9 C.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.). 
20
 For example, Korponay v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982] S.C.J. No. 111, 26 C.R. 
(3d) 343 (S.C.C.); R. v. Clarkson, [1986] S.C.J. No. 20, 50 C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Borden, 
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 33 C.R. (4th) 147 (S.C.C.). 
21
 For example, R. v. Goldman, [1979] S.C.J. No. 136, 13 C.R. (3d) 228 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 46 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).  
22
 [1974] S.C.J. No. 123, 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.). 
23
 [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 50 C.R. (3d) 55 (S.C.C.). 
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circumstances, the police must have provided proper announcement 
before entering, such announcement including their status as police officers, 
notice of their purpose, and a request to enter. This power was even 
extended to summary conviction provincial offences in R. v. Macooh.24 
Another area of law in which search and seizure concepts have now 
been applied is the regulatory sphere, a topic that will not be dealt with 
at length in this paper. Many regulatory schemes depend upon inspections 
by authorities, demands to produce licences or other documentation, filing 
of reports, etc. These now are subject to Charter analysis, albeit in a less 
stringent manner than for criminal prosecutions.25 Previously, however, 
there were few constraints other than political to fetter the discretion of 
state authorities. Therefore, statutory schemes might, but in no way were 
required to, contain standards for or constraints upon the exercise of such 
powers. 
This is not to suggest that Parliament and legislatures were oblivious 
to privacy concerns. As already indicated, in general, search and seizure 
powers often were framed in terms of reasonableness. Moreover, 
Parliament was attentive to the invasion of privacy brought about by 
technology. Wiretap legislation enacted in 1974 was explicitly framed in 
terms of protecting privacy and permitting its invasion under the scrutiny 
of judges.26 Indeed, the original legislation provided for the automatic 
exclusion of evidence obtained without a lawful authorization well before 
the constitution provided such a remedy. 
In conclusion, the pre-Charter period was one where legal standards 
existed but where meaningful remedies for their breach were nearly  
non-existent. At the same time, as the advent of the Charter approached, the 
courts and Parliament became increasingly attentive to privacy concerns. 
This in turn must surely have influenced the interpretation of section 8 
that soon followed. 
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 [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, 22 C.R. (4th) 70 (S.C.C.). 
25
 For a brief analysis of the current position, see: Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian 
Criminal Law, 2d ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2005), at 8-55–8-58. 
26
 Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50, now Part VI of the Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 entitled “Invasion of Privacy”; the legislative scheme has frequently been amended. 
The United States Supreme Court in Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967) had already recognized the 
threat to privacy posed by wiretaps and had also insisted on judicial authorization, undoubtedly 
influencing Parliament to move in the same direction. As originally enacted, an exception to judicial 
authorization was permitted where one of the parties to a conversation consented to its interception. 
This was found to be unconstitutional in R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.).  
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III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE CHARTER 
1. The Framework for Section 8 Analysis 
Before embarking on an analysis of the post-Charter position, it may 
be useful to set out the text of section 8: “Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” 
Given its vague and general wording, section 8 might have been 
interpreted as permitting any state intrusion that was considered reasonable 
in its context, premised on a relatively narrow property rights perspective, 
and, perhaps, confined to the type of state conduct most stereotypically 
associated with the terminology of “search” and “seizure”. This approach 
was essentially the argument advanced by the federal government in Hunter 
v. Southam.27 Happily, in what remains the leading judgment on search 
and seizure law, the Court took a broader and more purposive approach. 
Justice Dickson (as he then was) made several important 
pronouncements about the interpretation of the Charter in general and 
the specific guarantee in section 8. First, in keeping with the theory that 
the Charter must be interpreted in a manner related to its purpose of 
protecting rights that are primarily individual in nature, section 8 and 
other legal rights must be viewed as constraining, rather than authorizing, 
government action. That is, rather than providing authority to the state 
to engage in searches and seizures, the section is to be read as limiting 
laws authorizing such measures to what is reasonable. 
From there, Dickson J. went on to hold that the purpose behind 
section 8 is to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
unreasonable state intrusion. Drawing upon the American jurisprudence 
under their Fourth Amendment protection in relation to search and seizure, 
he explicitly rejected a property-based approach to the right. As the United 
States Supreme Court held in Katz v. U.S.,28 the protected interest is “the 
right to be let alone by other people” and therefore protects “people, not 
places”. The difference between a property-based approach and this 
broader privacy approach is well illustrated by the facts in Katz. The 
case involved police interception of conversations made from a public 
telephone booth. Under a property rights analysis, it would be difficult to 
see what constitutional protection might be afforded such conversations. 
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 Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam 
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. 
28
 389 U.S. 347, at 350-51 (1967). 
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However, under a privacy approach, it is readily apparent that electronic 
eavesdropping on a conversation is an infringement of privacy even if 
the conversation was conducted from a public phone. This is not to say 
that protection of places is not a part of privacy, merely that section 8 
protects more than places. 
The distinction between protecting privacy and protecting property 
is important. An interest in privacy is consistent with the purpose behind 
the Charter, namely, to constrain governmental action that is inconsistent 
with Charter rights. A property-based approach would do so in a much 
more limited way since only those having an interest in property could 
avail themselves of the right. Moreover, protecting privacy is far more 
consistent with the overall tenets of a liberal democracy such as Canada’s 
under which citizens are freed from governmental constraint as they carry 
on their lives unless the law indicates otherwise. It might be supposed 
that there is a shared value among Canadians that our privacy should be 
respected within reasonable limits. The purposive approach taken in Hunter 
v. Southam29 reflects this shared value. 
Indeed, it is possible that section 8 may be construed so as to protect 
interests broader than privacy. Both the United States Supreme Court in 
Katz30 and our Supreme Court in Hunter v. Southam31 alluded to protection 
other than merely for privacy but did not find it necessary to elaborate 
upon that theme for the purposes of the decisions. The effect, however, 
was at a minimum to jettison the law of trespass as the basis for assessing 
whether a search or seizure is reasonable. Implicitly, this approach also 
means that the conduct that amounts to a search or seizure must include 
state action beyond just the typical entry into a home or business premises 
to look for evidence. 
In Hunter v. Southam,32 Dickson J. went on to hold that the point  
at which the state interest in law enforcement or other objectives may 
supersede that of the individual’s privacy interest occurs when there is a 
“credibly-based probability” that evidence would be located in the place 
sought to be searched. This expresses the constitutional standard as 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing that evidence related to 
an offence will be discovered.33 
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 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
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 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
31
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
32
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
33
 It is not, however, a rigid standard. As subsequent discussion will show, some intrusions 
on privacy are permitted on a lower standard yet are very likely constitutional. 
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He then turned to the means by which the existence of such grounds 
should be determined. Expressing a preference for a warrant or other 
prior authorization whenever it is feasible, he held that an independent 
and impartial person must provide that authorization after receiving 
evidence on oath that meets the reasonable and probable grounds standard. 
As a consequence of this formulation, where a warrantless search or seizure 
has occurred, the state bears the burden of showing that a warrant was 
not feasible, that is, that the search was nonetheless reasonable. 
The subsequent case of R. v. Collins34 built on Hunter v. Southam.35 
In a case whose facts are strikingly similar to those in Brezack36 in 
involving a choke hold search of an individual’s mouth, then Lamer J. 
reiterated the placement of the burden on the Crown to show that a 
warrantless search was reasonable. He provided criteria for this assessment: 
“A search will be reasonable if it is authorized by law, the law itself  
is reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried out is 
reasonable.”37 
Although it was contingent upon the evidence to be adduced at the 
new trial that the Court ordered, Lamer J. also engaged in an analysis of 
the exclusion or admission of evidence under section 24(2) of the 
Charter, the principles for which still largely govern this area of the law. 
In striking contrast to the approach in Brezack,38 he found that the use of 
a throat hold search would be an unreasonable manner of search absent 
very clear evidence in support of its necessity. 
These two cases have provided the foundation for section 8 analysis 
ever since. They did not, however, address all issues. For instance, the 
terms “search” and “seizure” were not defined nor was guidance given 
as to when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, when a warrant is 
not feasible, or when variance from the reasonable and probable grounds 
standard is justified. These issues awaited answers in later cases. As will 
be seen, some of the answers have indicated regression from the purposive 
privacy-based analysis in Hunter v. Southam.39 
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 [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). 
35
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
36
 R. v. Brezack, [1949] O.J. No. 492, 9 C.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.). 
37
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 56 C.R. (3d) 193, at 206 (S.C.C.). 
38
 R. v. Brezack, [1949] O.J. No. 492, 9 C.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.). 
39
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
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2. The Heritage of the Hunter v. Southam and Collins Framework 
(a) Developments in the Case Law Consistent with the Framework 
In the short term after Hunter v. Southam40 and Collins,41 however, 
the decisions generally held true to the principles established in those 
cases. In R. v. Duarte,42 the Supreme Court held that the same standards 
apply to intercepted communications and therefore struck down the 
exception to judicial authorization where one of the parties consented to 
the interception. In R. v. Wong,43 the Court found that video surveillance 
amounts to a search requiring prior authorization and, in R. v. Wise,44 
came to the same conclusion in respect of the installation of a tracking 
device on a car. Several cases held that police walking around the perimeter 
of private property were engaging in a search.45 
To be sure, some nuances were involved. In R. v. Evans,46 although 
the Court held that the police, like any private citizen, have an implied 
licence to approach the front door of a house, if they do so with the 
intention of smelling marijuana, they are engaging in a search, which 
was conceived of as involving a form of examination by the state that 
invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. As subsequent cases have 
revealed, the key to defining a search is the second aspect — the existence 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy — rather than merely whether 
there was some form of examination. Thus, walking along public land in 
order to detect marijuana cultivation on private property was held not to 
be a search,47 nor was the observation of illegal gambling machines upon 
entering business premises open to the public.48 To this point, although 
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 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
41
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). 
42
 R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 74 C.R. (3d) 281 (S.C.C.). 
43
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 1 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
44
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, 11 C.R. (4th) 253 (S.C.C.). There were, however, suggestions in 
this case that something less than reasonable and probable grounds might suffice for such lesser 
intrusions on privacy. Parliament picked up on these suggestions in drafting ss. 492.1 and 492.2 of 
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 dealing with tracking device warrants and telephone number 
recorder warrants, respectively.  
45
 For example, R. v. Kokesch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 117, 1 C.R. (4th) 62 (S.C.C.); R. v. Grant, 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 24 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 24 C.R. (4th) 47 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Wiley, [1993] S.C.J. No. 96, 24 C.R. (4th) 34 (S.C.C.). 
46
 [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, 45 C.R. (4th) 210 (S.C.C.). 
47
 R. v. Boersma, [1994] S.C.J. No. 63, 31 C.R. (4th) 386 (S.C.C.). 
48
 R. v. Fitt, [1995] N.S.J. No. 83, 38 C.R. (4th) 52 (N.S.C.A.), affd on other grounds 
[1996] S.C.J. No. 6, 46 C.R. (4th) 267 (S.C.C.). 
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the Supreme Court had not comprehensively defined what state conduct 
amounts to a search, decisions such as Evans had begun to construct such 
a definition. However, that project awaited the development of a means 
of determining when there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, a 
topic that will be discussed in more depth later on in this article. 
In the meantime, in an earlier case, R. v. Dyment,49 the Court had 
defined a seizure as the taking of something by a state authority without 
the consent of the owner of the item if the individual from whom the item 
was seized had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The seizing of 
the accused’s blood in Dyment obviously fell within this definition. Before 
long, the definition had been extended to the regulatory sphere in relation to 
taking copies of documents or requiring their production.50 It was also 
applied in the criminal law sphere to embrace the taking of various bodily 
samples such as breath, blood, DNA, etc.,51 although the Court did not 
always make clear whether the state conduct was a search or a seizure. 
Interestingly, in R. v. Hufsky,52 the Court held that a requirement to 
produce a driver’s licence and registration was not a search because driving 
is a licensed activity with no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
documents. The Court did not consider whether the production of such 
documents might be construed as a seizure and, in light of the jurisprudence 
relating to the regulatory sphere,53 it might be suggested that the preferred 
reasoning would have been that a seizure was involved but, due to driving 
being a licensed activity, standards lower than Hunter v. Southam54 are 
appropriate. 
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This approach to licensed areas of endeavour soon carried over into 
the regulatory sphere. The Supreme Court has been consistent in holding 
that inspections, production or copying of documents, and similar state 
conduct will be assessed under section 8.55 Building on that approach, the 
Court has also constructed a means of distinguishing regulatory processes 
from criminal investigatory processes in the same statute. In R. v. Jarvis,56 
the Court upheld the administrative processes for auditing and verifying 
income and expenses that are set out in the Income Tax Act,57 even though 
they do not meet Hunter v. Southam58 standards. However, at the point 
that a criminal investigation is undertaken, the authorities must obtain a 
warrant and meet those standards. Jarvis also held that the information 
obtained at the administrative stage may be used in the later investigative 
stage, with the distinction between the stages occurring when the purpose 
has changed from regulation to determining criminal liability. Although 
the distinction may be difficult to assess in some circumstances, in a 
theoretical sense, the Court provided a sensible way of balancing the 
societal interest in maintaining a relatively simple self-reporting taxation 
scheme with the protection of privacy. 
The issue of the feasibility of obtaining a warrant has also been 
addressed by the courts. Hunter v. Southam59 had not taken an absolutist 
position to the warrant requirement but did not attempt to stipulate when 
a warrantless search or seizure might nonetheless be constitutional. The 
allocation of the burden on the Crown to demonstrate the requisite 
reasonableness whenever a search or seizure was shown to have been 
conducted without a warrant was and is an important rule, as is the 
three-pronged test set out in Collins.60 A case decided early in the Charter 
era, R. v. Rao,61 had held that a warrantless search might be reasonable 
in exigent circumstances and read down what was then section 10(1)(a) 
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of the Narcotic Control Act62 to comply with that approach. The Court 
noted that warrantless searches or seizures of motor vehicles would 
often be more justifiable because of their mobility. Subsequently, in  
R. v. Grant, the Supreme Court approved of this approach and defined 
exigent circumstances for the purposes of the same section as: 
. . . an imminent danger of the loss, removal, destruction or disappearance 
of the evidence sought in a narcotics investigation if the search or seizure 
is delayed in order to obtain a warrant. 63 
Obviously, whether a warrant was feasible is a factual determination 
in any given case. Hence, where there is imminent danger to a person or 
other similar emergency, a warrantless search or seizure would undoubtedly 
be permitted. 
The Supreme Court also has modified the previous common law 
position in respect of entry into dwellings in order to make an arrest. 
The common law permitted such entries without a warrant, provided 
that a proper announcement was made.64 However, in R. v. Feeney,65 the 
Court held that an entry warrant would now be required except where 
the entry was in hot pursuit of the suspect. The Court left open whether 
other exigent circumstances might also justify a warrantless entry. The 
Parliamentary response to Feeney will be discussed in the next section. 
Two other spheres of government action warrant brief mention. These 
concern customs and border crossings and prisons.66 Early in the Charter 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that there is a lower expectation 
of privacy at border crossings.67 In a later case, the Court also approved 
the reasonable suspicion standard for searching a vehicle to detect 
smuggling68 and for a passive bedpan vigil of someone suspected of 
importing drugs.69 The prison context remains somewhat unsettled. In  
                                                                                                            
62
 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1. 
63
 R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 24 C.R. (4th) 1, at 19 (S.C.C.). 
64
 See Eccles v. Bourque, [1974] S.C.J. No. 123, 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.); R. v. Landry, 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 50 C.R. (3d) 55 (S.C.C.); R. v. Macooh, [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, 22 C.R. (4th) 70 
(S.C.C.) and text on pp. 119-20. 
65
 [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 7 C.R. (5th) 101 (S.C.C.). 
66
 Schools are another sphere but will be discussed later in conjunction with common law 
search and seizure powers, and powers derived from more general statutory provisions. 
67
 R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, 66 C.R. (3d) 297 (S.C.C.). The case considered the 
Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40, now replaced by the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.). 
68
 R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, 1 C.R. (5th) 229 (S.C.C.). 
69
 R. v. Monney, [1996] S.C.J. No. 18, 24 C.R. (5th) 97 (S.C.C.). 
130 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Conway v. R.,70 the Supreme Court spoke rather cursorily of a greatly 
reduced expectation of privacy within prisons and held that no such 
expectation attached to searches of male prisoners by female guards. In 
R. v. Tessling,71 an obiter suggested a low level of protected privacy. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in R. v. Major,72 ruled that there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit low, for a prisoner and his 
family in a conjugal living unit. In both contexts, cautious support may 
be given to accepting a lower expectation of privacy, although the 
Conway ruling would be worrisome if it meant that prisoners had no 
privacy protection whatsoever. 
In general, the section 8 jurisprudence just discussed has been 
consistent with the framework established in the two leading cases. The 
exceptions to the warrant requirement in exigent circumstances and reduced 
levels of privacy in the regulatory, customs and prisons spheres are 
generally sensible and an appropriate balance between protecting privacy 
and the practical necessities of law enforcement and regulation. The lead 
taken by the courts has also prompted legislative responses that are 
frequently, although not always, in compliance with the framework. 
Two topics have not yet been discussed. One concerns what might 
be viewed as departures from this framework that have unfortunately 
weakened the protection for privacy that seemingly lies behind section 
8. The other topic concerns areas where the legislative branch has not 
acted but where the Supreme Court and lower courts have constructed 
police powers or tests for the exercise of such powers from the common 
law, or by implication, from more general statutory provisions. These 
initiatives by the judiciary have almost certainly resulted in making 
legislative action unlikely in these spheres. But before tackling those 
subjects, let me move to the legislative responses to the section 8 
framework. 
(b) Legislative Responses to the Framework 
On many occasions, Parliament has been obliged to respond to case 
law that has struck down a law or indicated that a new law is needed. In 
general, these legislative responses have been of three types. Some have 
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been direct responses to the jurisprudence, usually in the form of new 
warrant provisions or amendments to existing provisions to render them 
constitutional. The second category consists of what might be termed 
anticipatory responses in that Parliament draws upon aspects of the case 
law, such as obiter dicta or issues deliberately left open by the courts, to 
enact legislation to cover such situations.73 The final class of response 
consists of what has been termed “in your face” responses that are in at 
least some respects beyond what the Supreme Court of Canada has 
mandated.74 On some occasions, legislative responses have embraced 
two or even all three categories. Provincial and territorial legislatures 
have also acted in these ways, at least in the first two areas. 
Thus, we have seen a plethora of new search and seizure provisions 
enacted by Parliament in response to Supreme Court decisions. Duarte75 
led to amendments to the wiretap provisions in Part VI of the Criminal 
Code,76 first, to eliminate the consent interception route found wanting 
by the Court and, second, to bring the issue of exclusion or admission of 
wiretap evidence into line with section 24(2) of the Charter, rather than 
providing for automatic exclusion where Part VI has not been complied 
with. Wong77 led to the passage of section 487.01 of the Code, although 
the provision is much broader than merely permitting video surveillance.78 
Wise resulted in the enactment of section 492.1 to permit tracking device 
warrants; in so doing, Parliament evidently relied on an obiter in Wise 
that suggested that the permissible standard for such warrants might be 
at the level of a reasonable suspicion.79 Parliament also created telephone 
number recorder warrants in section 492.2 on the same reasonable 
suspicion standard. After R. v. Stillman80 held that a warrant was required in 
order to obtain DNA and other bodily samples, Parliament responded 
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with a series of warrant provisions in sections 487.04-487.092 to permit 
such measures. Parliament reacted to Feeney81 by passing sections  
529-529.5. In addition to providing for entry warrants, these provisions 
provide for warrantless entry in exigent circumstances, a matter left open 
by the Court, and, in the case of imminent bodily harm or death, permit 
entry on the lower standard of a reasonable suspicion. 
Parliament has also paid heed to what has been decided about the 
warrant requirement. The design of legislative provisions now generally 
permits warrantless searches or seizures where the grounds for a warrant 
exist but where there are also exigent circumstances.82 Section 487.11 of 
the Code, for example, applies this regime to section 487 and section 
492.1 tracking device warrants, although not for the more intrusive DNA 
and bodily sample warrants. A similar provision is contained in section 
11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.83 However, Parliament 
has also enacted section 487.1 of the Code, which permits the use of 
telewarrants where it would not be practicable to obtain a regular warrant. 
Therefore, before exercising a warrantless search or seizure power, the 
police ought to consider whether a telewarrant would be feasible and the 
exercise of a warrantless power should be assessed in that light. 
With the exception of the overly broad general warrant provision in 
section 487.01, these statutory provisions are supportable even where 
they depart from full Hunter v. Southam84 standards. The lower level of 
intrusion of tracking device and number recorder warrants and the reduced 
expectation of privacy involved in moving about in public both lend 
justification to a lower standard, the key being that in each case the 
technological device monitors only the location of a vehicle or telephone 
numbers, respectively, rather than activities or conversations. Similarly, 
the aim of preventing bodily harm or death is sufficient to justify entry 
on the lesser reasonable suspicion standard. 
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(c) Departures from the Privacy Framework 
Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the Court in Hunter v. Southam85 
to at a minimum protect an interest in privacy, there is a line of cases since 
then that is not entirely consistent with the rejection of the narrower 
property-based approach. These cases have restricted the establishment 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy in two ways: first, by narrowing 
the informational aspect of privacy and, second, by giving more primacy 
to the existence of a possessory or proprietary interest. 
Although Dyment86 is itself consistent with the privacy approach, it 
may have been the genesis of some of this regression. There, the Court 
found that an unreasonable seizure occurred when a medical practitioner 
turned a blood sample over to the police. This was primarily because of 
the violation of the sanctity of Dyment’s body but also because of another 
aspect of privacy, information about a person.87 As La Forest J. put it: 
In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is 
extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be 
compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound where the 
reasonable expectations of the individual that the information shall remain 
confidential to the persons to whom, and restricted to the purposes for 
which it is divulged must be protected. Governments at all levels have 
in recent years recognized this and have devised rules and regulations 
to restrict the uses of information collected by them to those for which 
it was obtained; see, for example, the Privacy Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, 
c. 111.88 
This was a strong statement in support of protecting personal 
information from state scrutiny. Unfortunately, it was soon distinguished. 
In R. v. Plant,89 a majority of the Court held that computer records 
showing the electrical consumption at a suspect’s house were not 
sufficiently personal and confidential to attract section 8 scrutiny. In other 
words, there was no expectation of privacy in the computer records. The 
majority reiterated the three facets of privacy — personal, territorial and 
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informational — that had been referred to in Dyment90 and, in relation to 
the informational aspect, restricted its ambit to  
a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a  
free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from 
dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends 
to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the 
individual.91 
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) dissented on this point, noting 
that the computer records in question were not available to the public and 
therefore required a warrant to infringe upon the expectation of privacy 
in them. 
The Court soon also moved more in the direction of a territorial-based 
approach to determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. This occurred in R. v. Edwards.92 The accused sought to 
assert such an expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s apartment. He 
stayed there from time to time, kept clothes and other belongings there, 
and had a key to the premises. The Court rejected his argument, largely 
on the basis that he did not have the ability to regulate access to the 
premises and did not contribute to the rent or other living expenses. In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court indicated that the determination of 
whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy existed should be 
based on the “totality of the circumstances”, which should include  
consideration of the following factors: 
(i) presence at the time of the search; 
(ii) possession or control of the property or place searched; 
(iii) ownership of the property or place; 
(iv) historical use of the property or item; 
(v) the ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude 
others from the place; 
(vi) the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and 
(vii) the objective reasonableness of the expectation.93 
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Edwards has therefore defined a search as a form of examination by 
the state but only where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that 
is determined in this property-oriented manner. This had the unfortunate 
effect of shifting the focus of attention back in the direction of the law 
of trespass that underlay the pre-Charter law and which was rejected in 
Hunter v. Southam.94 It is also reminiscent of the risk analysis that the 
Court had firmly rejected in Duarte95 and Wong,96 that is, the notion that 
an interest in privacy ceases to exist when a person does not have control 
over the place in which the authorities are undertaking what otherwise 
would be a search or seizure. Edwards is therefore in some sense a reversal 
of previous but relatively recent jurisprudence. 
This approach was reinforced in R. v. Belnavis,97 in which the Court 
held that a passenger in a motor vehicle has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy only if she has some degree of control over the vehicle, such as 
prior use or a relationship with the driver or owner that indicates a 
degree of access or privilege over the car. It is, of course, both true and 
commonsensical that there should be a reduced expectation of privacy in 
a vehicle relative to a dwelling. However, the effect of Belnavis and 
Edwards98 is to restrict privacy interests to a very great extent such that 
an accused who does not demonstrate some proprietary or possessory 
interest will have difficulty in establishing the necessary reasonable 
expectation of privacy to invoke section 8 protection.99 By way of 
illustration, one commentator has suggested that a child living in her 
parents’ home may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own 
bedroom.100 Moreover, to deny privacy protection for most passengers in 
motor vehicles provides great latitude to the police to conduct random 
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searches of both vehicles and passengers with the knowledge that their 
conduct will very likely be beyond constitutional scrutiny. 
As a result of these developments, it was but a short step for the 
Court to follow Plant101 in Tessling102 to hold that infrared technology 
used by an airplane to detect heat emanating from a home also did not 
infringe the informational sphere of privacy protected by section 8. The 
Court did indicate that the issue could be revisited in light of future 
technological advances but these decisions are troubling. It is highly 
debatable whether a person’s confidentiality is invaded through knowledge 
of electrical consumption or heat emanations. More troubling, however, 
is the tendency of lower courts to build upon the reasoning to find that 
other forms of investigation are also not within the ambit of section 8. 
This has recently come to the fore through a series of sniffer dog 
cases. Most such cases have involved the use of dogs specially trained to 
detect illegal drugs to sniff luggage in public transportation facilities.103 
The courts have been fairly consistent in applying Plant104 and Tessling105 
to hold that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such situations 
since an odour of marijuana or other drugs is seemingly not a part of the 
biographical core of an individual.106 In one case, R. v. M. (A.),107 the 
Court held that a random use of a sniffer dog on the personal belongings 
of students in a school was a search attracting Charter scrutiny because 
of the randomness and breadth of the police action. M. (A.) and one of 
the other cases, R. v. Brown,108 have been appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada and decisions are pending. Although Plant109 and Tessling110 
are unlikely to be overruled, it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court does 
not sanction extensions from those cases and provides greater guidance 
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for determining when technological surveillance techniques amount to a 
search by intruding upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The trend through these cases has been to regress from the broad, 
purposive approach to the protection of privacy taken in Hunter v. 
Southam.111 This is unfortunate. We should not hastily rule out an 
expectation of privacy. It is entirely understandable that the extent of the 
expectation might vary with the context, thus permitting warrantless 
searches in some situations and searches on something less than reasonable 
and probable grounds in others. Consider an illustration to make this 
point: typically, garbage is taken to be an abandonment of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.112 What, however, of the citizen who herself or 
through a family member inadvertently throws important financial or 
other personal information into the garbage? Could it safely be said that 
she has given up her expectation of privacy? To guard against snooping by 
the authorities, should all citizens be advised to buy shredders to shred the 
myriad papers containing personal information that we all throw into  
the garbage on a regular basis? If not, we should also seriously consider 
whether luggage or other personal belongings, even if in a public place, 
or heat and electrical consumption information similarly give rise to 
privacy protection. As I suggested at the beginning of this paper,  
in considering these issues, the operative question should be whether a 
person not carrying or growing drugs should be free from state scrutiny 
in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds and, absent exigent 
circumstances, a search warrant. 
(d) Judicial Activism of a Different Type 
A recurrent criticism of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court 
of Canada, is that they engage in “judicial activism”. The charge is, as 
McLachlin C.J.C. has put it, “usurping the functions of Parliament; of 
making the law rather than interpreting and applying it”.113 As the Chief 
Justice has noted, those advancing the criticism may come from all points 
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on the political spectrum.114 The allegation should be assessed with some 
understanding of the role of the judiciary in the common law legal 
tradition and sympathy for the fact that judges have been obliged to 
interpret and make sense of constitutional guarantees that are framed in 
vague and general language. In respect of the first, the long-standing 
heritage of the judiciary incrementally changing judge-made common law 
to suit contemporary demands is largely acceptable because Parliament 
and legislatures have sometimes chosen not to enact statutes or pass 
regulations to change the common law. The second is simply a fact of 
legal life in a country with a written constitution that must be interpreted 
and applied in a changing world. 
In this section, judicial activism is discussed in two much narrower 
forms: the creation of common law search and seizure powers through 
the ancillary powers doctrine, and the extension of such powers from 
general statutory provisions. My submission is that these are areas where 
judicial activism is inappropriate. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has now created police powers through 
the ancillary powers doctrine on several occasions, mostly through the 
approach taken in an obscure English case, R. v. Waterfield,115 a case 
which itself rejected the creation of a police power on its facts and 
which has been little considered in England. Thus, in R. v. Godoy,116 the 
Court held that there was a common law power for the police to enter a 
dwelling to investigate a 911 phone call that had been disconnected. In 
R. v. Mann,117 the same Court approved the power to briefly detain  
an individual for investigative purposes on the reduced standard of a 
reasonable suspicion of criminality. As a part of this new power, the 
Court granted police the power to search for weapons, although on the 
higher standard of reasonable and probable grounds. More recently, in 
R. v. Clayton,118 the Supreme Court extended Mann to the extent of 
permitting a roadblock to stop and search vehicles in response to a 
complaint about firearms even though the accused’s vehicle did not 
match the description of the suspect vehicles. 
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In other contexts, the Court has denied that it is creating a new 
police power but has extended existing powers through implication from 
more general statutes. This occurred, for instance, in R. v. M. (M.R.),119 
where the Court held that school officials have the power to search 
students and their belongings by inference from more general education 
statutes. These searches may be conducted without a warrant and on the 
loose standard that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a 
breach of school rules or discipline has occurred. In a situation much 
less directly related to search and seizure law, R. v. Orbanski,120 a 
majority of the Court found that the police have the power to request a 
citizen to perform physical sobriety tests or ask questions about alcohol 
consumption, even though there was no statutory basis for either.121 The 
reasoning was that these were section 1 limitations on the right to counsel 
by necessary implication from or the operating requirements of the 
legislation governing drinking and driving. 
All of these decisions have attracted a groundswell of criticism from 
academic and practising lawyers that is so voluminous that I will not cite 
it here. There are, however, some telling arguments against this trend: 
whether or not to grant the police certain powers to search, seize or do 
other things should be a democratic decision for legislators; if, as Hunter v. 
Southam held, the purpose of the Charter is to constrain government 
action, surely it is wrong for the courts to grant governments more powers. 
We should recall that the Court in that case struck down the legislation 
in question, refusing to consider the alternative remedies of reading in or 
reading down: 
While the courts are guardians of the Constitution and of individuals’ 
rights under it, it is the legislature’s responsibility to enact legislation 
that embodies appropriate safeguards to comply with the Constitution’s 
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requirements. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the details that will 
render legislative lacunae constitutional.122 
The creation of common law powers by the Court is an unfortunate 
betrayal of that position. It is also after-the-fact reasoning that by definition 
renders the law unknowable until the courts create the powers; by 
fashioning such powers, the courts deny citizens a real opportunity to 
challenge the constitutionality of the law in question (after all, would the 
Supreme Court of Canada recognize that it had previously created an 
unconstitutional law?); and, finally, it renders the law arbitrary because 
it cannot be known in advance when the courts will approve of police 
conduct in this manner. If the ability to know the law in advance is seen 
to be a component of the rule of law, the Supreme Court has been remiss 
in not at least admitting that the rule of law has been weakened through 
this line of cases. Moreover, the trend is clearly in the wrong direction 
of creating and expanding such powers. Clayton123 is worrisome because 
it appears as though the Supreme Court will now retroactively approve 
of police conduct that is considered to be reasonably necessary in the 
circumstances.124 
The granddaddy of common law police powers is, of course, the search 
and seizure power most frequently exercised: the power to search an 
individual who has been lawfully arrested. Because it precedes Waterfield125 
and is so deeply entrenched, the courts have not had to rely upon the 
tests developed in that case. Instead, the police are entitled to frisk 
search an arrestee without a warrant and virtually automatically, so long 
as it is for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, is 
not conducted in an abusive manner and does not extend beyond safety 
concerns, preventing escape or preserving evidence.126 Happily, in R. v. 
Golden,127 the Supreme Court held that, to justify a strip search, there 
must be reasonable and probable grounds for believing that evidence 
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would be located. As previously noted, Stillman128 caused Parliament to 
enact warrant provisions for the taking of bodily samples but, otherwise, 
Parliament has been content to permit the courts to make the law in this 
area. Grey areas remain, however, about other measures, such as body 
cavity searches. It is an area that should be legislated with clear standards 
for the police that can then be assessed by the courts. 
These developments have occurred in part because the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have failed to notice the extent to which they have 
expanded the arsenal of police powers and the problems engendered by 
doing so. They have also happened because Parliament and legislatures 
have not acted to pass legislation that could then be tested through the 
courts in the usual manner. Due to the frequent invocation of the 
Waterfield129 test, I am skeptical that these decisions will be reconsidered.  
I would hope, however, that recognition will be given to the problems 
inherent in this type of judicial activism and that therefore the Supreme 
Court will refrain from creating any additional powers or extensions of 
them. 
Parliament should also assert its authority and legislate in some of 
these areas. It is not unknown in the common law world for there to be 
legislation and regulations governing police investigations, including 
interrogations of suspects and search and seizure issues. For instance, both 
the United Kingdom130 and the Australian state of Queensland have done 
so for some years.131 In addition to providing welcome clarity and prior 
announcement of the law, this would afford litigants the opportunity to 
have such legislation assessed by the courts. For the judiciary, it would 
place them in their proper role as guardians and interpreters of the 
Constitution, rather than as the makers of the law.132 
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(e) The Impact of Section 24(2) of the Charter 
It will be recalled that the pre-Charter law on search and seizure was 
not devoid of legal standards. The difficulty in enforcing those standards 
was, however, in the lack of meaningful remedies. The advent of the 
Charter provided for remedies, including, as was seen in Hunter v. 
Southam,133 the striking down of legislation that is not in compliance with 
Charter requirements. For the most part, however, the most appropriate 
and frequent remedy that is sought is the exclusion of evidence pursuant 
to section 24(2). Collins134 established the framework for this analysis, 
although there was a terminological shift to conscriptive and non-
conscriptive evidence in Stillman.135 The question is whether the exclusion 
of evidence is an effective remedy to buttress the protection of privacy that 
has been afforded through the myriad and confusing cases just discussed. 
In Collins,136 Lamer J. indicated that the purpose behind excluding 
evidence obtained through a Charter breach was not to deter improper 
police conduct. Rather, it was to avoid the courts becoming further 
implicated in that misconduct, thereby reflecting badly on the administration 
of justice. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to suppose that disapproval of 
police conduct is not a consideration when evidence is excluded. The 
Supreme Court has said as much on several occasions.137 In the search 
and seizure context, however, the evidence is frequently placed in the 
non-conscriptive category, with the result that the virtually automatic 
exclusion that occurs under the trial fairness rubric is not applicable.138 
In such cases, whether the evidence is excluded or admitted is determined 
under the factors relating to the seriousness of the violation and the 
balancing of the effects of exclusion or admission on the administration 
of justice. The frequency of exclusion has changed over time with the 
result that exclusion now appears to occur more often, although still not 
nearly as often as in the case of conscriptive evidence.139 Is this, however, 
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a sufficient development to enable us to achieve some measure of 
deterrence of misconduct? The answer is probably not but it also does 
not mean that we should abandon the effort. 
One of the problems is to whom deterrence is to be directed in the 
search and seizure context. Were the issue solely whether the police or 
other state officials involved in gathering evidence might be deterred 
from impropriety, there might be at least a degree of sharpness to the 
debate. Failure to abide by known legal requirements might (and should) 
elevate the seriousness of the violation to the point where exclusion 
should be the presumptive remedy. Unfortunately, in a legal regime where 
common law powers have been frequently developed, it is very difficult 
to assume the requisite knowledge. Instead, there is an incentive for the 
police to do what they consider to be necessary in the circumstances in 
the hope that the courts will later find it to be reasonable. Clayton140 has 
now enshrined this approach. 
But it is a more complicated issue than that. Judges issue search 
warrants or assess whether a warrant should have been required and, 
according to the available data, do not rigorously insist upon adherence 
to required legal standards.141 But there are no legal consequences for a 
justice or judge who has failed to insist on the legal requirements for the 
issuance of a search warrant nor, in a system that requires the independence 
of the judiciary, should there be. Unless the judiciary is meticulous in 
requiring compliance with legal standards, its involvement in the process 
diffuses whatever deterrent effect there might be from excluding evidence 
that was improperly obtained.142 That is, it would be necessary to both 
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deter improper police misconduct and improper application of the law 
by judges, a tall order indeed since we are rather hapless at achieving 
deterrence through the sentencing process where there is a far more direct 
connection between the misconduct and a sanction. 
Although it is apparent that efforts to achieve compliance with the 
law of search and seizure will be imperfect, the answer may lie as a 
combination of two steps. First, more frequent exclusion of non-
conscriptive evidence, particularly where there has been a failure to 
abide by well-established requirements, would be useful even if it is 
acknowledged that a greater likelihood of exclusion will not cause an 
overnight change in police behaviour. Second, in spite of the comments 
by the majority in Clayton143 that it should not be considered in relation 
to section 24(2) of the Charter, we might devote much more attention 
and resources to the training of police and other investigative officials 
so that they are more cognizant of their legal responsibilities. We could 
also provide for greater training, particularly of justices of the peace, 
who are often charged with the responsibility for issuing search warrants 
to see that they are familiar with the legal requirements that they must 
oversee.144 If we did so and there were still instances of failing to abide 
by well-known requirements, the likelihood of exclusion of evidence 
should surely be increased.145 At the very least, the police should not be 
rewarded by having non-conscriptive evidence obtained through non-
compliance with known law admitted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Much has happened in the 25 years that have passed since the Charter 
came into force. This is certainly apparent in the law of search and seizure, 
whose pre-Charter form is scarcely recognizable today. That said, a 
promising beginning has had mixed developments since. The framework 
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established early on in Hunter v. Southam146 and Collins147 was sound 
and led to other improvements in protecting privacy. Nevertheless, the 
retrenchment that has occurred through decisions such as Tessling,148 
Edwards,149 and Belnavis150 is disappointing and regressive. While it is 
generally true that legislatures have paid heed to what the courts have 
required, this has not always occurred. Some of the responsibility lies 
with the judiciary for stepping too quickly into the breach and creating 
common law police and other powers. Some of it lies with the legislators, 
who have too often been content for the courts to assume that role. In 
assessing the state of the present search and seizure law, we would do 
well to recall the beginnings of the Charter era and attempt to return to the 
broader perspective of protecting against undue infringements of privacy. 
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